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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Respondents generally agree with Appellant's statements
regarding the jurisdiction of this Court and the nature of the
proceedings below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In late 1981, Appellant responded to Respondents'
newspaper advertisement for the sale of the Subject cinder block
plant and related equipment. (T 17)
From the beginning of their dealings, Appellant
understood that Respondents had never operated the plant; could
not and would not warrant its condition. (T £>1, 153-154, 158) In
fact, Appellant knew that Respondents had sefen the plant produce
block on only one occasion.

The former ownetrs had requested

permission to make one more "run" after turning possession of the
plant to Respondents.

(T 21)

According to Appellant's own accountr Respondent Larkin
"directed" him to talk to the former owners and find out what the
machinery was capable of doing. (T 153-154)

Respondent Larkin

also encouraged Appellant to talk to Gerald Strong who had
completely rebuilt the block plant.

(T 155)

Appellant also initiated contact vfith Praschak Block
Company, the original manufacturer of the pliant.

(T 154)

Following this contact, Appellant inspected -he machinery and
found nothing which discouraged him from puisuina contract
negotiations with Respondents.

(T 155)

Respondents did nothing which in iny way impaired
1

Appellant's access to or inspection of the machinery. (T 153)
In the course of negotiations Respondent Larkin
attempted to project the income-producing capability of the plant
by using various levels of production and assuming various
factors including the wholesale price of block, the cost of
cement, cinders, labor, repairs and maintenance, etc.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, and 14)
On or about March 25, 1982, Appellant approached
Respondent Larkin and asked him to prepare another projection
based upon an abbreviated year (9 months).
Exhibit No. 14)

(T 45-46; Plaintiff's

By Appellant's own account, this revision was

sought because: "I'd been there long enough to know it [the block
plant] wouldn't operate the way he [Larkin] said it would do." (T
166)

By March, Appellant was thoroughly acquainted with the

block plant and related equipment.

(T 35, 36, 166-167)

By May, 1982, Appellant had become discouraged as a
result of problems he was experiencing with the plant and decided
not to pursue the consummation of any contract with Respondent
Lava Products.

(T 150)

In Appellant's own words: ". . .it

became obvious to me about then that there was no way, with my
limited funds, that I could ever get that block machine to
operate." (T 52)
Appellant then testified that in September, 1982,
Respondent Larkin contacted Appellant and offered to help
Appellant get the block plant into operation. (T 52-53, 157)

The

record clearly indicates that Respondents spent a great amount of
2

time and money in the fulfillment of that copimitment. (T 54, 5759, 63-68)
Between October, 1981, and Decembei:, 1982, Appellant
spent at least 73 days at the block plant. (T 152)

Finally the

parties reached an agreement regarding the l^ase and purchase of
the plant.

This agreement was reduced to writing and signed on

December 21, 1982. (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. L8)
Appellant's own ledgers indicate that following the
execution of the agreement, he never made the necessary
investment of operating capital, spending but a small fraction of
the monies which had been projected for repairs, maintenance, and
labor.

(T 169-170, 172-175; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31)
Frustrated and discouraged by continuing difficulties,

Appellant ultimately abandoned the undertaking in September,
1983.

(T 100-101)

This lawsuit was initiated in October.

At trial Appellant called Michael Bracken and Lemuel
Leavitt as witnesses.

Bracken testified that he had previously

operated the block plant for the former owner, Veyo Concrete
Products, and that he had been able to operate the plant on a
continuous basis. (T 136-137)

Bracken also testified that Veyo

Concrete had been able to produce between 9,000 and 11,000 block
per week with this plant. (T 138-139)

Finally, Bracken testified

that he found nothing unrealistic in Respondent Larkin's
production projections. (T 139-140)
Leavitt' s testimony provided no mofre support for
Appellant's position than had Bracken's. Leavitt testified that
3

he had worked at the plant when it was owned and operated by Veyo
Concrete.

(T 145)
After Appellant had abandoned his interest in the block

plant, Leavitt and another individual had purchased the plant
from Respondent Lava Products paying $3,000 more for the facility
than Appellant had contracted to pay. (T 142, 146-147;
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 18 and Defendant's Exhibit No. 37)
Leavitt testified that as late as September and October, 1986, he
had produced as many as 7,000 blocks per week at the plant. (T
143-145)

He also testified that in his opinion a production

projection of 40,000 blocks per month would not be unreasonable
if the operator possessed sufficient capital. (T 146)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's evidence failed to establish a prima facie
case of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.

Indeed

Appellant's own evidence fails to establish that Respondents made
any representation which could have reasonably been understood to
be presently existing fact.

Furthermore, if projections provided

are so construed, Appellant's own evidence fails to establish
that the representations were false.
Even if the income projections were representations of
fact and were false, there is no evidence indicating that
Repondents knew or should have known that the projections were
inaccurate or misleading.
Finally, the evidence clearly establishes that
Appellant could not have acted reasonably and in ignorance of the
4

falsity of the representations.

His own evidence establishes

that long before he executed the lease/purchase agreement, he had
acquired a position equal with, if not superior to, Respondents—
a position from which to thoroughly evaluate the condition and
capacity of the block plant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO WEIGH
THE EVIDENCE OR EVALUATE THE CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES IN ORDER TO REACH ITS CONCLUSION.
Respondents agree with the authorities cited in Point I
of Appellant's brief.

A review of the transcript (T 198-201)

clearly indicates that it was not necessary for the trial court
to weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of any of the
witnesses called by Appellant.

Indeed the trial court was of the

opinion that the evidence presented, viewed in the light most
favorable to Appellant, did not establish a prima facie case of
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.
Even if this Court shall determine that the trial court
improperly engaged in weighing the evidence br judging the
credibility of witnesses, it is respectfully submitted that this
conduct did not constitute prejudicial error since, as hereafter
pointed out, there was no evidence adduced by Appellant
concerning essential elements of his case, feee Cerritos Trucking
Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, Utah, 645 P.2d 60& (1982).
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POINT II
APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE
OF FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are set
forth in the oft-cited case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247
P.2d 273 (1952).

These elements include:

(1) That a representation was made;
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representations;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his injury and damage.
122 Utah at 144-145.
Where a claim is made for negligent misrepresentation,
there is a slight variation in the fourth element of the cause
and one who is in a superior position to know material facts may
be held liable if he carelessly or negligently misrepresents the
facts, provided that the other elements of fraud are made out.
Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 U.2d 378, 423 P.2d 659
6

(1967) (Note particularly footnote 2 and accompanying text at
381).
Whether the case is considered one of fraud or
negligent misrepresentation, it is obvious that Appellant failed
to establish that the income projections were made or intended as
representations concerning "a presently existing material fact".
In Hartford v. Drive-In Corporation/ 374 Mich. 192, 132
N.W.2d 143 (1964), the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a
chancellor's decision denying rescission upon allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation where plaintiff claimed to have
relied upon a sample operating statement projecting net earning
based upon gross annual sales of $150,000, $175,000, and
$200,000.
The court was not convinced that the hypothesized
income figures constituted representations of fact upon which
plaintiff could have reasonably relied.

We quote from the

opinion:
We have examined the written materials which
plaintiff claims were false and upon which he
claims to have relied. Assuming, but only
arguendo, that they contained representations upon
which plaintiff was entitled to rely, we cannot
find in the proofs any evidence of their falsity.
They consisted of three sample operating
statements showing what net income could be
expected, normal operating expenses considered,
from assumed gross annual sales of $150,000,
$175,000 and $200,000. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that plaintiff's net income
would have been less than that hypothesized had he
in fact grossed $150,000. That he did not realize
gross sales during his 10 months of operation at a
rate which even approached $150,000 for the year,
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could very well have been the result of
plaintiff's own mismanagement, of which there was
some evidence.
132 N.W.2d at 144.
Even if the projections in the instant case are viewed
as statements of fact rather than estimates or opinion, the
unrebutted testimony of Michael Bracken and Lemuel Leavitt
establishes that the projections were not unrealistic in light of
their experience both before and after the subject transaction.
(T 139-140, 146)
Furthermore, assuming that the projections were
representations of fact and were false, it is apparent, in light
of the testimony of the former operator and the current owner,
that Appellant failed to present any evidence indicating that the
Respondents knew or should have known that the projections were
false or misleading.
Perhaps the most obvious void in Appellant's case lies
in the fact that if representations were made and if they were
false, Appellant could in no way have acted reasonably and in
ignorance of their falsity.

Appellant, by his own account was in

possession of the subject property for at least 73 days prior to
the time he signed the lease/purchase agreement. (T 151-152)

His

access to the equipment and the former owners was not impaired in
any way (T 153) and he was not only encouraged, but by his own
account "directed", to talk to the previous owners concerning the
production capabilities of the block plant. (T 153-154)

He was

also encouraged to talk to Gerald Strong who had completely
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rebuilt the block plant (T 155) and he called Praschak and
discussed the plant's operation with the original manufacturer.
(T 154)
One who complains of injury by reason of another's
misrepresentation may not heedlessly accept as true that which
his own experience calls into question.

See Jardine v. Brunswick

Corp., supra; Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Real-py, Utah, 641 P.2d
124 (1982); Kohler v. Garden City, Utah, 639 P.2d 162 (1981).
By March, 1982, Appellant was thoroughly familiar with
the condition and capacity of the plant and Related equipment. (T
166-167)

He ultimately signed the lease/purchase agreement in

December, 1982, and was contemplating exercising his option to
purchase as late as July or August, 1983. (T 85, 181)
The argument that Appellant acted Reasonably and in
ignorance of the falsity of representationsrtiadeis in direct
conflict with Appellant's own testimony.
Finally, to the extent that Appellant seeks to
establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the evidence
clearly establishes that he, rather than the Respondents, was in
the superior position to evaluate the condition of the block
plant and related equipment and consequently his negligence was
as great, if not greater, than any negligenc^ of which
Respondents may have been guilty.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that appellant's evidence
failed to establish a prima facie case of frauaulent or negligent
9

misrepresentation.

Indeed Appellant's own evidence fails to

establish that Respondents made any representation which could
have reasonably been understood to be presently existing fact.
Furthermore, if projections provided are so construed,
Appellant's own evidence fails to establish that the representations were false.
Even if the income projections were representations of
fact and were false, there is no evidence indicating that
Respondents knew or should have known that the projections were
inaccurate or misleading.
Finally the evidence clearly establishes that Appellant
could not have acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity
of the representations.

His own evidence establishes that long

before he executed the lease/purchase agreement, he had acquired
a position equal with, if not superior to, Respondents—a
position from which to thoroughly evaluate the condition and
capacity of the block plant.
The Judgment of Dismissal should be affirmed and
Respondents should recover their costs on this appeal, and
should, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 33, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, recover attorney's fees reasonably incurred in
the defense of this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of November, 1987.

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Respondents
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